NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 48 | Number 3

Article 21

4-1-1970

Torts -- Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal
Acts of Third Persons
Michael R. Becker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Becker, Torts -- Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 713 (1970).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol48/iss3/21

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

19701

LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS

legal maneuvers in which the plaintiff must indulge."' Congress should
act in this situation to allow an individual to sue directly in a federal
court. However, until Congress does act, a suit that is brought directly
in a federal court should be retained by the court and disposed of on
non-federal grounds under the concept of pendent jurisdiction.
JOSEPH

E.

ELROD

III

Torts-Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons
In Ramsay v. Morrisette' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decided that it was appropriate to re-evaluate the scope of a landlord's
duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of third persons. The
plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apartment house, was assaulted by a
man who broke into her apartment. She alleged that the landlord was
negligent in not taking reasonable steps to protect his tenants in light
of his knowledge of prior criminal activity. Specifically, she alleged that
the defendant-landlord was negligent for his failure to supply a full time
resident manager, to lock the front door, and to prevent intruders from
sleeping in the halls of the apartment house.' The trial court granted the
landlord's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed,
" Although no pattern has been discerned that will support a hard and fast
rule, a caveat is appropriate at this point. It is notable that in cases in which
removal was allowed, none was found in which the federal officer was found
liable on the claim against him. It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that
the "color-of-office" requirement necessary for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442
is sufficient to give a federal officer tort immunity, i.e., to conclude that if the
federal officer was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, then he
was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow tort immunity. While a federal
officer can be acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, it is
recognized that his acts may be so in excess of his authority that he can be
held individually liable for them. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), wherein the Court stated:
[T]he action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so
"illegal" as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case,
are constitutionally void.
Id. at 701-02.
See also Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), in which the Court said
that "one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the
defense of official immunity tried in a federal court." Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
1252 A.2d 509 (D.C. App. 1969).
'Id.

at 512.
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holding that the tenant's allegations of negligence were sufficient to
preclude summary judgment.'
In deciding whether a landlord should be held responsible for the
criminal acts of third persons, the court could have approached the
problem in various ways. There is case law holding that the landlord
has a duty to use reasonable care in keeping safe for his tenants those
areas over which he has retained control.4 However, mere ownership
of the premises does not make the landlord an insurer of tenants' safety.
Instead, the standard is one of due care in light of the circumstances.
Liability based upon the principle of retained control has generally been
confined to responsibility for physical defects in the premises.' The acts
of third persons was the central issue in Ramsay, and, arguably, the
principle of retained control should not be extended to include liability
for the criminal acts of third persons:
That liability predicated on the "dangerous conditions" theory should
be limited to defects in the land becomes clear when one examines
the considerations which gave rise to a duty in such situations: Where
repair is necessary, it is only the landlord who is able to remedy such
His control and ability to remedy are exclusive. Where
defects ....
the source of injury is not inherent in the land and where control is

not exclusive-where the considerations involved are not those of land
ownership but rather those of social relationships-the essential
7
meaning of the principle of control is inapplicable.
A second approach often used by the courts faced with a criminal
act by a third person is an inquiry into "proximate causation." The
traditional rule is that one is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts
of others8 unless he could have foreseen such a result as the consequence
8

Id.
'E.g., Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAw OF ToRTs 418 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER].
E.g., Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 455, 177 A.2d 263 (1962).
'E.g., Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A.2d 689 (1954); see PROSSER
418-21. But cf. Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439
(App. Div. 1964), in which the court relied upon the theory of retained control
in finding a landlord liable for the act of a third person. In Mayer a child was
hit by a rock while playing on the housing authority's playground. The court held
that the jury could find the housing authority had been negligent in failing to
provide adequate supervision for the playground and consequently was liable for the
child's injury.
'20 RUTGERS L. Rsv. 140, 143 (1965). The note criticizes the application of
the retained-control theory in Mayer.
'E.g., Andrews & Co. v. Kinsell, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (1901); see
PROSSER 173-79.

1970]
of his own actions.
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For example, in McCappin v. Park Capitol Corp.,10

in which the tenant sued the landlord to recover money stolen from the
tenant's apartment, the court denied recovery on the grounds that the
tenant-plaintiff had failed to establish proximate cause. The thief had
apparently stolen a key to the tenant's apartment from the landlord. The
court, in basing its decision on proximate cause, did not affirmatively
decide whether the landlord had been negligent in the first instance.
Consideration of proximate cause before negligence serves only to
obscure the real issue." Legal responsibility or proximate cause deals with
the issue of liability of a negligent actor and in proper analysis does not
arise until the negligence of the actor has been established. More specifically, proximate cause analysis entails determination of the various
policy considerations that go together to define the scope of the negligent
defendant's responsibility for his actions. Courts seizing upon proximate
cause as a means for disposing of cases similar to Ramsay assume without
proper evaluation of the facts that the defendant has been negligent.
Few cases have dealt with whether a landlord owes a duty of protection to his tenants in a factual context closely analogous to that in
Ramsay. 2 The majority of courts that have reached the issue have
found no duty on the part of the landlord. 13 One of the major reasons
behind this conclusion is the long prevailing argument that the tenant
can have in his lease provisions for protection by the landlord against
third persons. In DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty, 4 for example, the

court held that the landlord was under no duty to provide a doorman for
his apartment building in the absence of a contractual obligation. The

'See
PRossan 178.
1042 N.J. Super. 169,

126 A.2d 51 (App. Div. 1956).

" See Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 220, 157 P.2d 372, 376 (1945)

(Traynor, J., concurring); Green, Merlov v. Public Service Co.-A Study in
Proximate Cause, 37 ILL. L. REv. 429 (1943); Note, 24 MI.NN. L. REv. 666
(1940).
2 The

court in Ramsay cited Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673
(D.C. Cir. 1956), as supporting a finding of a duty to protect. The case involved
a landlord's employee with a criminal record killing a tenant. The court in KendaU
held that the landlord was negligent in not checking the employee's past criminal
record. In reaching its decision the court stated that the tenant, under her lease,
paid for both shelter and protection. However, this case is clearly distinguishable
since it deals with the crime of an employee.
"8 Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ; De Foe v. Sloane, 99
A.2d 639 (D.C. App. 1953); Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 70 N.J. Super. 245,

175 A.2d 433 (App. Div.), rev'd, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). But see Bass
v. City of New York, 38 U.S.L.W. 2345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 1969).
U48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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landlord had brought an action against various tenants for nonpayment
of rent, and the defense offered was that various criminal activities by
third persons had been committed within the apartment building because
the landlord negligently failed to provide a doorman. The court stated:
[I]ncidents of crime, perpetrated by third persons within the premises,
impose no obligation upon the landlord to provide doorman service,
especially where there has been no contractual obligation or obligation
imposed by statute to provide the same.' 5
Ransay, at least implicitly, rejected the theory that if the tenant
desires protection from the landlord, he can provide for it in the lease.
This theory is clearly unrealistic in the modern world. The landlord is
almost always in a superior bargaining position vis-A-vis the tenant.
Because the demand for adequate housing continues to rapidly fall farther
behind the available supply, it is clear that the tenant will probably never
be able to insist on a provision in his lease requiring protection by the
landlord. Furthermore, the landlord is in a better position to take protective measures and to absorb their cost through redistributing it. Obviously, judges do not have to close their eyes to the realities of presentday life. They can and probably should take judicial notice of the overall
shortage of available housing and the inequality of bargaining power
between landlord and tenant.
The fact that the prospective tenant has no power over the lease offered
him supports the position taken in Ransay--that it is now time to impose
a duty of reasonable care on the landlord to protect his tenant-in short,
to make him liable for negligence. Judicial determination that one party
" Id. at -, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 466. There are several cases that implicity rely
upon the view that any duty to protect must be imposed by the lease or not at all.
This consideration seemingly underlies the reasoning that the landlord has not
committed a wrongful act by his failure to take reasonable steps to protect his
tenants. Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); De Foe v. Sloane,
99 A.2d 639 (D.C. App. 1953). The landlords in both cases were held not liable
for criminal activity despite the fact that they had inadvertently provided the
opportunity for the crime.
In DeKoven, Applebaum, and De Foe the landlords did not have notice of
prior criminal activity; thus the cases can arguably be distinguished from the
situation in Rainsay where the landlord-defendant had notice. However, the question of notice may be a distinction without a difference. See Goldberg v. Housing
Authority, 70 N.J. Super. 245, 175 A.2d 433, rev'd, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962), in which notice of prior criminal activity was disregarded by the court.
But see Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div.
1964), in which the court apparently found notice to be a significant factor in imposing liability on the landlord.
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owes a duty of protection to another is certainly not novel. Over time
the courts have found various social relationships to be of such a nature
that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to protect. These
relationships include: carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, business
proprietor and invitee, school district and pupil, and employer and employee.1 6
The real issue in Ramsey and similar cases is whether the landlord
breached the duty of reasonable care. The ultimate decision in the determination of negligence is reached by balancing the burden to be imposed
on the landlord with the extent of the risk to the tenant."' Applying such
an analysis, most courts will either direct a verdict for the landlord or
will submit the question to the jury for determination. Submission to
the jury raises the question of its competence to pass on the various policy
questions involved in such cases. Therefore, the jury should be fully
informed of those questions either by court instruction or by counsel in
argument to the jury.
In considering the application of the formula of due care, it is worth
looking to some of the more obvious aspects of a landlord's actions or
non-actions that may well be found to fall short of the standard of reasonable care. It is such narrowly defined behavior to which the court and
jury must look in determining whether the landlord has in fact exercised
due care.
For example, the failure of the landlord to supply adequate locks for
apartment doors should be sufficient to show a lack of reasonable care.
Provision of adequate lighting, both inside and outside the building,
may also be considered a minimum burden for the landlord. Further, a
failure to provide a manager (perhaps a resident manager) may also be
a failure to use due care in protecting tenants. A manager would have
the authority to supervise common areas and prevent the situation that
existed in Ramsay.
In determining the extent of care that the landlord must exercise to
fulfill the duty to protect, it also seems reasonable to consider the location of the apartment house. Landlords in neighborhoods with past histories of criminal activity should be held to a stricter standard of protection
than are those in areas in which there has been little or no prior criminal
activity.
" PROSSER 177.

1

'7Id. 152.
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It is obvious that any substantial requirement of protection will result
in a proportionate increase in rents charged tenants. In other words, the
burden of any duty likely will fall on those who can least afford it. This
adverse economic consequence undoubtedly will result primarily from
increased liability insurance costs and the costs of protective measures.
Another factor that must be considered in weighing the economic
consequences of imposing a duty of protection on the landlord is the fact
that some areas are subject to rent control. In those areas a landlord
will not be able to increase his rents to cover the increase in costs by
spreading the risk among all tenants. To conpensate for the increased
costs, the landlord may reduce maintenance or other essential services.
Moreover, all other things being equal, the decreasing profit margins
will undoubtedly lead to a decrease in the supply of housing, clearly an
undesirable result."8
The importance of the economic ramifications from the imposition
of a duty on the landlord to protect his tenants against criminal actions
of third persons militates against permitting the jury to decide the question of duty. The jury is simply not prepared to receive and comprehend
the economic factors that should be considered thoroughly. The courts
are obviously more qualified. The question arises, however, whether
even the courts are sufficiently qualified; for it may well be that the
resolution of this problem requires the type of intensive inquiry that only
the legislatures can provide. The legislature of a state can provide a
uniform policy that its courts cannot. If the proper solution of the problem involves governmental expenditures, the legislature is clearly the
proper body to consider such measures.
While the actual end-solution to the problem of crime in the cities, if
there is one, will depend upon legislative processes, it is not unreasonable
for the courts to require a landlord to take some protective measures on
behalf of his tenants, especially if he has notice of prior criminal activity
on the premises. At the least, tort law should require landlords to provide
some forms of minimum protection for individual tenants.
MICHAEL
"See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNomIcs 385-89 (6th ed. 1964).
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